After taking off from North Las Vegas Airport (KVGT) and flying 60 miles, they landed at Mesquite, Nevada (67L), where they added 10 gallons of fuel. The pilot with the airplane rating, who had flown the first leg, now ceded the left front seat to one of his companions, evidently with the idea of giving him some flight instruction. He moved to the right seat, and they performed several touch-and-gos before continuing toward Bryce Canyon, 105 miles distant.

The terrain rises from around 4,000 feet msl near Mesquite to around 7,800 feet at Bryce. Between them is a pass at 8,500 feet. Shortly before reaching that pass, and still below 8,000 feet, the Cirrus stalled, flipped inverted, and crashed into a mountainside, killing all four men. The Cirrus was equipped with an Avidyne solid-state primary flight display that stored an array of flight and engine data. The memory module was undamaged, and investigators were able to reconstruct the flight in detail. The story it told was surprising.

To start, the airplane was about 225 pounds over gross weight when it left Mesquite. The air temperature on the ground near the accident site was 80 degrees, and the density altitude over 9,000 feet. At the time of the accident, the airplane was just a few hundred feet above the surface, barely climbing, and only 4 miles away from the 8,500-foot pass. Its indicated airspeed was around 70 knots, and for the three minutes before the loss of control, the stall warning had been sounding almost continuously. All the while, its 210 hp Continental engine was turning at a leisurely 2,300 rpm.

• READ MORE: Only Assumptions Can Be Made About What Took Down a Curtiss C-46 in Alaska

So many things are wrong with this picture that I hardly know where to begin. But let’s start with general mountain flying principles. The wind was from the southwest, so the airplane would not expect to encounter downdrafts in the pass. Nevertheless, because in mountainous areas winds close to the surface are unpredictable, it’s chancy to fly toward rising terrain with the idea that you will just make it over the next ridge. Better to circle and climb, and not approach the ridge until you have the altitude to safely clear it, and approach it at a 45-degree angle, in order to have room to turn away if you don’t have enough altitude. The Cirrus, which had reached as high as 7,847 feet, had actually begun to lose altitude, probably because of its very low airspeed, before the stall occurred.

Even overloaded, and despite the high density altitude, the Cirrus had sufficient power to climb at 375 fpm. But to do so would have required increasing the rpm to 2,700, the rated maximum. It would also have required maintaining the best rate-of-climb speed, which was 93 kias. At 2,300 rpm, the calculated rate of climb at 93 knots would have been 22 fpm. At the stall speed, it was zero or less.

As a helicopter professional, the airplane-rated pilot—he was legally the pilot in command, and we assume he was the pilot flying—may have felt comfortable flying from the right seat. But the instrument cluster was on the left, making it difficult for him to see the airspeed indicator. Still, the stall warning should have been airspeed indicator enough.

He was a very experienced pilot, with more than 5,600 hours. Only 160 of them, however, were in fixed-wing airplanes, and only 17 in the SR20. He had originally gained his airplane rating in an SR20 but then began renting an SR22, which has the same airframe but 100 more horsepower. He had not flown an SR20 for 18 months before this trip and used it only because the SR22 he usually rented was not available.

Two major errors, which are immediately obvious to a fixed-wing pilot, are the failure to fly at the best rate-of-climb speed and the failure to increase rpm to make use of all the power available. The low speed may possibly be explained by the pilot wanting to use the best angle-of-climb speed, or by the fact that the best rate-of-climb speeds of helicopters are generally lower than those of fixed-wing airplanes, usually around 60 or 70 knots. As for the rpm, main rotor rpm is not normally used in setting power in a helicopter. Rotor rpm is set at a customary value and remains there, while power is controlled by throttle and, in both turbine and most modern reciprocating-engine helicopters, some type of automatic correlation or linkage with the collective, which controls the average pitch of the main rotor blades. It’s not hard to imagine that fixed-wing power-setting practices might be eclipsed by the ingrained habits of a helicopter pilot with limited fixed-wing experience who flies helicopters daily but airplanes only seldom.

• READ MORE: A Night Flight Leads a Pilot to a Tragic End

That the stall warning could have been allowed to sound for several minutes also seems incredible, but helicopters do not stall. Perhaps the pilot imagined that he could safely fly at what he believed to be the best angle-of-climb speed and that the stall warning was a mere unavoidable nuisance.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) blamed the accident on the “pilot’s failure to maintain sufficient airspeed and airplane control,” to which his assumed lack of experience operating heavily loaded airplanes in a high-density-altitude environment contributed. The NTSB made no effort to explain the egregious failure to use an appropriate speed and all available power, to circle to climb, or to stay well clear of the terrain. The agency did, however, report that the pilot had previously been admonished for overloading an airplane, gone out of his way to conceal his overloading of this one, and was prone to “try to circumvent things” with employees of the rental firm. The NTSB may think that imperfect morals predispose pilots to accidents, but in this case the cause was not overloading by a few percent nor the intent to deceive the renters about it. It was the blatantly faulty management of the airplane.

I used to visit Robinson Helicopter Co. in Torrance, California, from time to time, and founder Frank Robinson, always very cordial and hospitable, would send up one of his pilots with me for a little jaunt to administer CPR to my four-decade-old, but seldom used, helicopter rating. Once he flew with me himself and cautioned me against a too-abrupt forward push on the cyclic. He said this was an error to which fixed-wing pilots were prone when startled, for instance, by the sudden appearance of conflicting traffic. It was harmless in a fixed-wing airplane but dangerous in a helicopter, because the main rotor blades could strike the tail boom. He preferred that helicopter pilots learn to fly in helicopters and not come to them polluted by fixed-wing habits.

It works both ways.

Note: This article is based on the National Transportation Safety Board’s report of the accident and is intended to bring the issues raised to our readers’ attention. It is not intended to judge or reach any definitive conclusions about the ability or capacity of any person, living or dead, or any aircraft or accessory.

This column first appeared in the January-February 2024/Issue 945 of FLYING’s print edition.

The post Fatal Cirrus Accident Shows That Some Knowledge Doesn’t Translate appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The Super Bowl procedures and restrictions will affect pilots flying near Las Vegas on February 7-12, with the game itself set for February 11 beginning at 3:30 p.m. PST. The FAA says it will be releasing a notice to air missions (NOTAM) for the event later this month covering “procedures for the game and specific arrival and departure route requirements.” In addition, the agency has set up a webpage dedicated to providing GA pilots with relevant information on Las Vegas-area airports and airspace leading up to the NFL championship game at Allegiant Stadium.

During the February 7-12 time frame, special air traffic procedures are expected to be in effect for Las Vegas’ Harry Reid International Airport (KLAS), North Las Vegas Airport (KVGT), Henderson Executive Airport (KHND), and Boulder City Municipal Airport (KBVU). Parking reservation programs will also be in effect for those airports from February 7-13. The FAA recommended that pilots flying in for the game familiarize themselves with the Vegas-area airports via the agency’s From the Flight Deck video series.

A temporary flight restriction (TFR) for the Super Bowl itself is expected to be active on February 11 from approximately 2:30-8:30 p.m. PST, though that is subject to change. The FAA says the TFR will be centered on Allegiant Stadium with a 10 nm inner core and 30 nm outer ring. The agency noted that it will not affect regularly scheduled commercial flights out of KLAS.

• READ MORE: NFL, Congress Wary of Rising Drone Incursions During Games

The FAA emphasized that Super Bowl LVIII, a designated National Security Special Event, is a “No Drone Zone,” with restrictions in place for uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS/drones). 

The post FAA Offers Heads-Up for GA Pilots Flying Near Super Bowl LVIII appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The airport has parallel runways: 30L, measuring  5,000 feet by 75 feet, and 30R, which measures 4,199 feet by 75 feet. 

The approach end of Runway 30L is approximately 1,000 feet north of the approach end of Runway 30R. Runway 30L is a non-precision runway. Runway 30R  is a precision runway with aiming point and touchdown zone markings, which help distinguish it visually from 30L.

A husband and wife were aboard the Piper. According to a radio transmission made to another pilot in the pattern, the couple in the Piper were flying in from Idaho. The occupants of the Cessna were a flight instructor and learner in the pattern for Runway 30R, practicing takeoffs and landings.

According to the NTSB preliminary investigation, both airplanes were in contact with the tower at the time of the accident. 

The Piper had been cleared to land on Runway 30L and had acknowledged the clearance three times in three separate transmissions, but continued flying toward 30R.

The collision occurred approximately 0.25 miles from the approach end of Runway 30R.

Accident Timeline

1156:08

Piper N97CX is on an IFR flight plan and approaching from the north. Nellis Radar Approach Control clears N97CX for the visual approach at KVGT and instructs the pilot to overfly the airport at midfield for left traffic to Runway 30L. 

1158:26

Air traffic control responsibility for the flight is transferred from Nellis Radar Approach Control to the North Las Vegas tower, and Piper N97CX is instructed to fly left traffic for Runway 30L. 

Meanwhile, Cessna N160RA is instructed to fly right traffic for Runway 30R. The ADS-B records for the day show the Cessna had already made several laps in the pattern for 30R.

1158:43

The pilot of N97CX contacts KVGT tower and reports: “Descending out of 7,600 feet msl for landing on three zero left and ah Nellis said to cross midfield.” 

The tower controller replies, “Continue for three zero left.” 

The pilot acknowledges the transmission with, “Okay continue for runway three zero left nine seven charlie x-ray, we will cross over midfield.” 

1200:03

The pilot of N160RA requests a “short approach.” 

The tower controller replies, “zero romeo alpha short approach approved, runway three zero right, cleared for the option.” 

Cessna N160RA acknowledges the transmission. 

1201:36

The tower controller transmits, “November seven charlie x-ray runway three zero left cleared to land.”

The pilot of N97CX responds, “Three zero left cleared to land nine seven charlie x-ray.” 

The ADS-B track shows the Piper in a left turn, but it does not appear to be lining up with Runway 30 Left, rather the aircraft is swinging wide as if to land on the parallel Runway 30R.

1201:57

The tower controller transmits, “Seven charlie x-ray I think I said it right, runway three zero left, seven charlie x-ray runway three zero left.” 

The pilot of N97CX replies, “Yeah, affirmative runway three zero left, that’s what I heard nine seven charlie x-ray.” 

This is the final transmission from both aircraft, and they collide approximately a quarter of a mile from the approach end of Runway 30R.

The FAA illustration included in the NTSB report based on the ADS-B data shows both aircraft had lined up for Runway 30R.

Witnesses on the ground reported seeing the right wing of the Piper and the left wing of the Cessna collide before both aircraft plunged to the ground.

Photographs of the Piper wreckage show the Piper fuselage primarily intact. The NTSB report mentioned longitudinal scratches were visible along the right side of the fuselage.

The NTSB also noted damage to the Piper’s right wing, including “impact separation” and the right inboard wing section, which remained attached to the fuselage, was canted aft. The right wing flap was fractured about midspan. The crush impressions to the leading edge of the wing contained flakes of green primer, and there were cuts to the de-ice boot.

The Cessna, missing most of the left wing, hit the ground in a nose-low attitude, coming to rest inverted on a 304-degree magnetic heading. Also, the aircraft burned, the report said.

According to the NTSB, “About 4 [feet] of the left wing, which included the left aileron, was separated from the left wing, and was found on the edge of a culvert just south of the main wreckage. The left outboard wing section aft of the forward spar was found to be separated near the aileron-flap junction. The left wing flap was found to be separated from the wing.” 

Blue paint transfer was found on the lower surface of the separated left wing and the lower surface of the left wing flap. Black de-ice boot material transfer was observed on the lower surface of the separated outboard left wing, and the lower surface of the attached portion of the left wing, stretching about 5 feet outboard of the strut attach point, along the lower leading edge.

Most of the Cessna was consumed by fire, excluding the cabin roof.

The final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation. NTSB investigations can take a year to 18 months to complete.

The post NTSB Releases Preliminary Report on Las Vegas Midair appeared first on FLYING Magazine.